

Political Communication of the Civil Society Movement as a Pressure Group in the Prabowo-Gibran Government

Yogaraksa Ananta*¹, Wahyu Agung Nuril Fahmi ², Kenneth Sulthon Alafi Al Hallaj³, Nirzam Fahrurh Irgy Al Hafidz⁴, Eka Firmansyah⁵

¹Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia, atnanaaskaragoy@gmail.com

²Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia, wahyufafa19@gmail.com

³Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia, elaphy07@gmail.com

⁴Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia, fahruhirgy@gmail.com

⁵Universitas Muhammadiyah Palu, Indonesia, ekafirmansyah689@gmail.com

*atnanaaskaragoy@gmail.com

Received: 2026-April-15

Rev. Req: 2026-May-09

Accepted: 2026-June-22

ABSTRACT: This study examines how the civil society movement in Indonesia communicates politically and its implications for the Prabowo-Gibran government. A qualitative descriptive approach through library research was applied, analyzing data from journal articles, institutional reports, and documentary sources through an interactive data model. Dan Nimmo's political communication theory serves as the primary analytical lens, positioning civil society as activist type political communicators. The findings reveal, first, that the Indonesian civil society movement functions as a non state political actor that articulates public interests, shapes public opinion, and influences public policymaking under the Prabowo-Gibran administration through advocacy, mass mobilization, and digital campaigning. Second, this political communication carries significant implications for governance, it increases citizens' willingness to voice aspirations, intensifies collective action outside electoral mechanisms, produces a more critical public opinion toward government policies, and generates an inherently ambivalent relationship between the state and civil society. These findings confirm that civil society communication continues to function as a vital instrument of social control and a mechanism that keeps Indonesia's checks and balances system alive under the current government.

Keywords: *Political Communication, Civil Society, Pressure Group, Prabowo-Gibran*

I. INTRODUCTION

Political communication is a fundamental element that shapes the dynamics of social and political life in a modern democracy. The social world becomes more dynamic when political communication is understood comprehensively by every communicator involved in the political process. This condition is closely intertwined with the workings of contemporary democratic systems, in which political communication is no longer the exclusive domain of formal actors such as the government, political parties, and legislative institutions, but also involves non-state actors organized within civil society. The presence of civil society is important because it functions as a bridge between the interests of the public and the process of public policymaking, while simultaneously acting as a control mechanism over state power. In many democracies, civil society commonly assumes the role of a pressure group that seeks to influence government policy through a variety of political communication strategies, including advocacy, public campaigning, mass mobilization, and the use of digital media. Civil society organizations, in this sense, act as an alternative channel of participation that pressures decision-makers to keep public interest at the center of the policy formulation process, a pattern that has long been visible in Indonesia's regional and national policy arenas alike (Setyawan, 2011) [1].

The gap between the theoretical promise of civil society and its actual political capability has also long been debated in the literature. Civil society is frequently celebrated as the guarantor of democratic accountability, yet its practical ability to constrain the state depends heavily on how effectively it can communicate its interests to both the public and to policymakers (Baker, 1998) [2]. This theoretical caution is a useful reminder that civil society's influence on governance is not automatic; it must be actively constructed through communication, coalition-building, and sustained public engagement rather than simply assumed from its formal existence.

The inauguration of Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka in October 2024 introduced new political dynamics into Indonesia's democratic landscape. Various flagship government programs, together with bureaucratic reform initiatives, investment strengthening measures, and national economic policies, have triggered diverse responses from civil society. The Prabowo-Gibran government has also displayed a strong pattern of political communication through the use of digital media, populist branding, and political symbolism that

resonates closely with ordinary citizens. This communication strategy is directed at building political legitimacy while simultaneously securing public support for the policy agenda being pursued. At the same time, government policies have also triggered criticism, resistance, and demands for accountability from civil society organizations, advocacy groups, student organizations, non-governmental organizations, and digital communities alike. Civil society activism directed at holding the government accountable is not unique to the current administration; it is part of a longer trajectory of civic contestation that has continued, and in some respects intensified, since the late New Order era, moving through cycles of narrowing and reopening of civic space depending on the political climate of the day (Setiawan & Tomsa, 2023) [3].

Indeed, even amid a broader climate of democratic contestation, Indonesian civil society activists have continued to demonstrate adaptability and resilience, occasionally succeeding in halting or reversing policies they consider harmful to democratic consolidation and human rights protection (Mietzner, 2021) [4]. This resilience is best understood through the lens of diagonal accountability, a concept describing the capacity of civil society actors, independent media, and engaged citizens to constrain government action through mass protest, public awareness campaigns, and investigative reporting that operate outside the formal mechanisms of elections and state institutions (Laebens & Lührmann, 2021) [5]. Diagonal accountability becomes especially significant in political contexts where vertical accountability through elections and horizontal accountability through state institutions are considered insufficient to prevent the erosion of civil liberties, a condition that several scholars argue has become increasingly relevant across Southeast Asian democracies, including Indonesia, in recent years (Bünthe & Weiss, 2023) [6].

At the beginning of the Prabowo-Gibran administration, several strategic issues have drawn the attention of civil society organizations, including policy transparency, the effectiveness of welfare programs, environmental concerns, civil liberties, and governance practices more broadly. These groups employ a wide variety of political communication strategies to influence both the government's policy agenda and broader public opinion. The forms of communication used are not limited to street demonstrations and official statements, but also extend to digital campaigning, the production of alternative discourse, and the construction of cross-organizational advocacy networks. This phenomenon indicates that civil society functions not merely as an external watchdog, but also as an active political actor within the process of public policy formation, a dynamic that mirrors the broader relationship between state and society that has historically characterized

Indonesia's search for democratic space since the early reform period (Mundayat et al., 2009) [7].

Based on the researcher's observation, although studies on the political communication of the Prabowo-Gibran government have begun to develop, most existing research still focuses on the government's own communication strategy, its political strategy, or the use of social media by political elites. Studies that specifically examine the political communication of civil society as a pressure group within the context of the Prabowo-Gibran government remain limited. Understanding the communication strategies employed by civil society groups is nonetheless essential for explaining how the articulation of public interest, the formation of public opinion, and the dynamics of power relations unfold within Indonesia's contemporary democratic system.

Based on this background, this study aims to analyze the political communication of the civil society movement as a pressure group within the Prabowo-Gibran government. This study seeks to answer two questions: first, how does the political communication of the civil society movement in Indonesia operate; and second, what are the implications of that political communication for the Prabowo-Gibran government.

II. METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach with a descriptive method through library research (*studi pustaka*). This method was selected because the research objective is to understand and analyze the political communication of the civil society movement as a pressure group through a variety of literary sources, documents, media coverage, scientific journals, and prior research findings, rather than to measure or test a hypothesis numerically. Within this design, the researcher functions as the primary instrument, actively selecting, reading, and interpreting textual data drawn from academic and documentary sources concerning civil society activism, digital political communication, and governance in contemporary Indonesia.

The data sources used in this research consist of secondary data obtained from peer-reviewed journal articles indexed in Sinta and Scopus, institutional and monitoring reports, and official documentation related to government policy under the Prabowo-Gibran administration. Data collection was conducted through a systematic search of relevant literature using keywords such as "civil society," "pressure group," "political communication," "digital activism," and "Prabowo-Gibran," followed by a selection process that prioritized sources published

between 1993 and 2026 with clear theoretical or empirical relevance to the research questions.

The data obtained were analyzed using the interactive model of qualitative data analysis, which consists of three interrelated activities: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Data condensation involved selecting, simplifying, and organizing the raw information extracted from the literature according to the two main research questions. Data display involved arranging the condensed data into descriptive narrative categories reflecting, first, the pattern of civil society's political communication and, second, its implications for the Prabowo-Gibran government. Conclusion drawing and verification were carried out iteratively throughout the writing process, cross checking emerging interpretations against additional literature to ensure the coherence and credibility of the findings. Dan Nimmo's political communication theory is used as the primary analytical framework, particularly his classification of political communicators into politicians, professionals, and activists, which provides the conceptual foundation for positioning civil society as an activist type political communicator operating within Indonesia's contemporary democratic system.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Political Communication of the Civil Society Movement in Indonesia

Since taking office, the Prabowo-Gibran government has experienced various political dynamics, some of which involve the engagement of civil society movements utilizing a range of instruments, including mass consolidation, social media, and narratives that emerge and circulate within the public sphere. According to Dan Nimmo, political communication is fundamentally an act of message delivery that carries consequences for the political system. Political communication is not limited to government and political parties, it is also carried out by interest groups, pressure groups, civil society organizations, mass media, and ordinary citizens. From this perspective, civil society is one type of political communication actor that plays an important role in conveying public aspirations while simultaneously monitoring the conduct of government (Nimmo, 2001) [8].

Following the fall of President Soeharto's New Order regime, Indonesia's civil society movement experienced significant growth. Non-governmental organizations, community based advocacy groups, student organizations, professional associations, and digitally based movements became part of an active civic force influencing the public policy process. Their presence demonstrates that political communication is no longer dominated solely by the state but instead

involves multiple actors interacting within a shared public space, which further affirms civil society's role as an instrument for advancing the moral project of democratization in Indonesia through the political communication it conducts (Arifian Nawafi', 2025) [9].

Building on Nimmo's theoretical framework, civil society can be understood as a political communicator that seeks to shape public opinion through the dissemination of information, policy advocacy, political education, and public mobilization. Various civil society movements in Indonesia use political communication to build collective awareness of public issues such as democracy, human rights, the environment, anti-corruption, economic policy, and governmental transparency. Through these activities, civil society seeks to shape public perception while exerting political pressure on the government to consider public interest in its decision making processes, a dynamic clearly visible in how public discourse on the "X" platform evolved during the government's early period in office (Yarnis & Harmonis, 2025) [10].

Within Nimmo's typology, the civil society movement falls under the classification of the activist type political communicator. Nimmo distinguishes among several types of political communicators, namely politicians, professionals, and activists. Politicians are communicators pursuing specific political objectives aimed at winning a political contest. Professionals are communicators who seek to influence a target audience but who conduct such activity primarily because of occupational demands and financial compensation. Activists, by contrast, are communicators originating from a group or organization pursuing certain objectives to influence a target audience, but without receiving any direct compensation or salary for doing so. Following this classification, the civil society movement in Indonesia is best categorized as an activist-type political communicator (Nimmo, 2001) [8].

The classification of civil society organizations as activist type communicators is further reinforced by comparative evidence indicating that authoritarian leaning governments often respond to civil society pressure by attempting to redraw the legal and institutional boundaries within which such organizations may operate, a pattern documented not only in Indonesia but across several other transitional and semi authoritarian contexts as well (Knox & Sharipova, 2024) [11]. Where such boundaries narrow, civil society organizations tend to adapt their communication strategies rather than abandon their advocacy role altogether, often turning to context specific capacity building efforts that strengthen their internal organizational communication and external public messaging simultaneously (Weber et al., 2024) [12]. It is also worth noting that not all civil society actors

operate with equal influence, a smaller circle of well resourced and well networked civil society elites frequently plays a disproportionate role in shaping the movement's overall communication agenda, a dynamic that should be considered when analyzing which voices within civil society gain the greatest traction with policymakers and the public (Johansson & Uhlin, 2020) [13].

In line with this, the political communication conveyed by political communicators inevitably produces particular effects on the audience. Within the context of Indonesia's civil society movement, political messages are frequently delivered through various communication channels, including mass media, social media, public discussions, petitions, formal statements, and street demonstrations. These channels are used to construct public opinion capable of strengthening civil society's bargaining position *vis à vis* the government. The broader the reach of a political message and the greater the public support it receives, the greater the potential influence civil society can exert over public policy. Empirical evidence from Indonesia's digital sphere shows that even seemingly playful forms of online expression, such as memes, can function as a bridge that converts political cynicism into concrete forms of online political participation, thereby expanding the repertoire of communication tools available to civil society actors beyond conventional advocacy formats (Ahmed & Masood, 2024) [14]. Similarly, studies of social media use during moments of electoral tension in Indonesia illustrate how restrictions on digital access can themselves become a trigger for further civic mobilization and critical public discourse, underscoring how tightly political communication and political participation are intertwined in the digital era (Anggraheni et al., 2021) [15].

Beyond its role as a political communicator, civil society also functions as a pressure group. According to Nimmo, political communication is not intended solely to convey information, but also to influence the distribution of power within the political system. Consequently, various civil society organizations in Indonesia frequently use political communication strategies to push for policy change, criticize government decisions, or monitor the implementation of public programs. The advocacy activities carried out by civil society organizations are, at their core, a form of political communication directed at influencing the government's policy agenda (Baker, 1998) [2].

As a pressure group *vis-à-vis* the government, the civil society movement uses digital media to catalyze various public interests through emerging narratives, with platforms such as X, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube functioning as new spaces for civil society organizations to disseminate narratives, consolidate public support, and build collective movements. This phenomenon shows that the

development of communication technology has expanded civil society's capacity to reach wider audiences and to create more effective political pressure on the Prabowo-Gibran government. In examining how such narratives take shape, framing theory offers a useful complement to Nimmo's communicator centered framework, since it explains how communicators select and make certain aspects of an issue more salient in a communicating text in order to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, or moral evaluation (Entman, 1993) [16]. In a highly fragmented digital media ecology, this framing process is no longer a one way flow from elite communicators to a passive audience; it has instead become a fractured and cascading process in which multiple actors, from government officials to civil society organizations to ordinary social media users, contest one another's frames simultaneously (Entman & Usher, 2018) [17].

This contestation of frames is visible in the way different segments of the media and the public construct competing images of the Prabowo-Gibran government, ranging from framing strategies intended to build a positive presidential image (Ardinata et al., 2023) [18] to framing analyses that trace how survey results and electoral narratives are used to shape public perception during and after the 2024 presidential contest (Devit & Ridwan, 2023) [19]. At a broader structural level, the persistence of illiberal tendencies within Indonesia's media and political environment has also been argued to constrain the space in which independent framing and critical civil society narratives can circulate freely, adding another layer of pressure that civil society communicators must navigate (Lim, 2023) [20]. This structural pressure on independent media and civic communication is not unique to Indonesia, it is part of a broader pattern across Southeast Asia in which sustainability of independent media outlets is increasingly contingent on their ability to withstand political pressure from incumbent governments (Nugroho & Syarief, 2024) [21].

Taken together, and consistent with Dan Nimmo's theory of political communication, the Indonesian civil society movement can be understood as a non-state political actor that performs a communicative function to articulate the trilogy of public interest, shape public opinion, and influence public policymaking under the Prabowo-Gibran government. The presence of civil society demonstrates that democracy is determined not only by formal state institutions, but also by civic movements that use political communication as an instrument of oversight and control over power. This is further reinforced in the emerging digital public sphere, where technology enabled deliberation and knowledge sharing are increasingly proposed as mechanisms to strengthen democratic accountability, even as such digital arenas simultaneously expose Indonesian democracy to new

risks of disinformation, polarization, and unequal digital access (Nugroho, 2026) [22].

Implications of Civil Society's Political Communication for the Prabowo-Gibran Government

The political communication conducted by the civil society movement carries significant implications for the dynamics of the Prabowo-Gibran government. From a political communication perspective, the act of delivering political messages by civil society groups is intended not only to convey public aspirations, but also to influence the decision making process within the political system. Civil society has additionally become a new source of strength for individuals or groups marginalized by the prevailing economic, political, and social system, which in turn becomes a resource that such movements use to advance a range of public interests (Arifian Nawafi', 2025) [9].

Civil society's role as a critical counterbalance to state power is not automatically guaranteed under any government, including the current one, rather, it depends on whether civil society actors can sustain effective advocacy coalitions and continue to exercise diagonal accountability even as the political environment becomes more constrained (Weiss, 2021) [23]. This is a crucial consideration for the Prabowo-Gibran government, given that the sustainability of civil society's political communication has, in comparable settings, been shown to depend heavily on the movement's ability to build broad coalitions across different segments of society, ranging from student organizations and professional associations to environmental and human rights groups (Tomsa & Bax, 2023) [24].

The political communication conducted by civil society organizations functions as an instrument of social control as well as a balancing mechanism against state power. In modern democracies, civil society is regarded as one of the primary arenas for the expansion of democracy and the protection of citizens' rights. Under the Prabowo-Gibran government, various civil society organizations, student groups, advocacy institutions, and digital communities utilize both mass media and social media to convey criticism, input, and demands regarding a range of public policies. This phenomenon demonstrates that political communication is no longer monopolized by state actors, but instead involves non state actors who participate in the formation of public discourse and the broader democratic process.

The first implication of civil society's political communication is the increased involvement of citizens in voicing their aspirations. Through criticism, advocacy, and public oversight, civil society groups encourage the government to become

more transparent and responsive to public needs. This activity strengthens the mechanism of checks and balances within the government, since civil society's political communication effectively broadens the range of actors capable of holding government power accountable through diagonal, rather than purely electoral, means (Laebens & Lührmann, 2021) [5].

The second implication is the increasingly massive scale of civil society's collective movement in the form of mass action. The political communication constructed by the civil society movement opens space for the public to become involved in the political process outside the mechanism of elections. Through collective movements and mass action, civil society is able to convey its interests and aspirations directly. This condition strengthens the quality of democracy, since citizen participation becomes an essential element in the process of overseeing government, a pattern of engagement that continues to recur across different administrations regardless of which political coalition holds executive power (Mietzner, 2021) [4].

The third implication is the formation of a more critical public opinion toward government policy. In Nimmo's theory of political communication, the political messages conveyed by various actors shape the public's perception and political attitudes. The civil society movement utilizes digital media to disseminate information, construct alternative narratives, and educate the public on policy issues as well as legal and human rights matters. As a result, the public gains access to a variety of perspectives that can shape public opinion in a more independent and critical manner. This dynamic is intensified in an environment where framing contests among competing political actors are increasingly conducted on digital platforms, requiring the public to actively navigate multiple, often contradictory, narratives before forming an opinion (Entman & Usher, 2018) [17].

Finally, the fourth implication is that civil society's political communication indirectly shapes the emerging dynamic between the state and civil society. On one hand, the criticism and advocacy carried out by civil society can serve as a critical partnership for the Prabowo-Gibran government in improving its policies. On the other hand, differing views on the direction of public policy have the potential to generate political tension, occasionally becoming a widely discussed topic on social media. Nevertheless, within a democratic system, the presence of criticism from civil society is an indicator that the space for civil liberties and political participation continues to function. Democracy requires the existence of independent organizations capable of sustainably overseeing state power, a relationship of mutual constraint and occasional friction that has become a

defining feature of civil society's position across similarly situated democracies in the region (Bünthe & Weiss, 2023) [6].

Furthermore, the political communication activities carried out by civil society organizations are intended not only to influence government policy, but also to raise citizens' political awareness of their rights, obligations, and the importance of society's role as a counterbalance to the state. This ongoing dynamic reflects Nimmo's broader argument that political communication is inseparable from the distribution and exercise of power, positioning civil society's communicative activity as a continuous, rather than episodic, component of Indonesia's democratic life under the Prabowo-Gibran government.

IV. CONCLUSION

The findings of this study indicate that the civil society movement in Indonesia functions as a non state political communication actor occupying a strategic position within the democratic system. Based on Dan Nimmo's theory of political communication, the civil society movement can be categorized as an activist type political communicator that seeks to influence public opinion and the policymaking process through organized political messaging. In its development, civil society's political communication is conducted not only through conventional mechanisms such as public discussion, advocacy, petitions, and demonstrations, but also through digital media, which serves as a new space for constructing narratives, consolidating support, and articulating public interest. The presence of student organizations, non governmental organizations, advocacy communities, professional associations, and other social movements demonstrates that political communication in Indonesia is no longer monopolized by the state or political parties, but instead unfolds openly through the interaction of multiple actors within the public sphere. Civil society thereby functions both as a channel for citizens' political participation and as a pressure group that seeks to keep public policy aligned with the interests of the people.

This study also finds that the political communication of the civil society movement carries significant implications for the dynamics of the Prabowo-Gibran government. First, the political communication conducted by civil society strengthens the function of social control and the mechanism of checks and balances against state power through criticism, advocacy, and policy oversight. Second, civil society's political communication encourages greater political participation outside the electoral mechanism by opening space for citizens to voice their aspirations directly through various forms of collective movement. Third, these communicative activities contribute to the formation of a more

critical public opinion toward government policy, particularly through the use of digital media as an instrument for disseminating information and political literacy. Fourth, civil society's political communication produces an inherently ambivalent relationship between the state and civil society, which on one hand can serve as a critical partner to the government in refining policy, but on the other hand carries the potential to generate political tension due to differing interests and perspectives on a given policy. Notably, this dynamic is characteristic of democratic systems in general, as it demonstrates that the space for civil liberties, political participation, and oversight of power continues to operate actively under the current government.

V. REFERENCES

- [1] Setyawan, D. (2011). Peran civil society sebagai pressure group dalam perumusan kebijakan publik (Studi pada Malang Corruption Watch [MCW]). *Reformasi*, 1(1), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.33366/rfr.v1i1.6>
- [2] Baker, G. (1998). Civil society and democracy: The gap between theory and possibility. *Politics*, 18(2), 81–87. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00064>
- [3] Setiawan, K. M. P., & Tomsa, D. (2023). Defending a vulnerable yet resilient democracy: Civil society activism in Jokowi's Indonesia. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 42(3), 350–371. <https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034231209058>
- [4] Mietzner, M. (2021). Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials. *Democratization*, 28(1), 161–178. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1796649>
- [5] Laebens, M. G., & Lührmann, A. (2021). What halts democratic erosion? The changing role of accountability. *Democratization*, 28(5), 908–928. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1897109>
- [6] Bünthe, M., & Weiss, M. L. (2023). Civil society and democratic decline in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 42(3), 297–307. <https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034231212488>
- [7] Mundayat, A. A., Narendra, P., & Irawanto, B. (2009). State and civil society relationships in Indonesia: A society-oriented reading in search for democratic space. *PCD Journal*, 1(1/2), 75–96. <https://doi.org/10.22146/pcd.25678>
- [8] Nimmo, D. (2001). *Political communication and public opinion in America* (2nd ed.). Longman.
- [9] Arifian Nawafi', A. Y. (2025). Gerakan moral civil society menuju demokratisasi di Indonesia. *Jurnal Ilmiah Manunggal: Ilmu Sosial, Budaya*,

- Politik, Komunikasi, 10(2), 131–143.*
<https://doi.org/10.55719/manunggal.v10i2.2067>
- [10] Yarnis, Y., & Harmonis, H. (2025). Political communication in public opinion: 30 days of Prabowo-Gibran government on platform "X." *Avant Garde*, 13, 30–46. <https://doi.org/10.36080/ag.v13i1.3690>
- [11] Knox, C., & Sharipova, D. (2024). Authoritarianism and civil society in Central Asia: Shifting boundaries. *Journal of Civil Society*, 20(2), 109–129. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2024.2324874>
- [12] Weber, P., Krawczyk, K., Ezeonu, B. I., & Tuggle, F. (2024). How to leverage action research to develop context-specific capacity building for civil society organizations. *Nonprofit Policy Forum*, 15(1), 49–69. <https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2022-0041>
- [13] Johansson, H., & Uhlin, A. (2020). Civil society elites: A research agenda. *Politics and Governance*, 8(3), 82–85. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i3.3572>
- [14] Ahmed, S., & Masood, M. (2024). Breaking barriers with memes: How memes bridge political cynicism to online political participation. *Social Media + Society*, 10(2). <https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051241261277>
- [15] Anggraheni, P., Setyowati, N. T., & Harry, H. (2021). Social media and political participation in Indonesia: Restrictions access at announcement results of 2019 presidential election. *ASPIRATION Journal*, 2(1), 85–123. <https://doi.org/10.56353/aspiration.v2i1.23>
- [16] Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x>
- [17] Entman, R. M., & Usher, N. (2018). Framing in a fractured democracy: Impacts of digital technology on ideology, power and cascading network activation. *Journal of Communication*, 68(2), 298–308. <https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx019>
- [18] Ardinata, S. R., Marini, & Salas, H. J. (2023). Framing pemberitaan Prabowo dalam membentuk citra positif pada media TV One. *Jurnal Komunikasi dan Sosial Politik*, 5(1), 50–60. <https://doi.org/10.47637/komsospol.v2i1.1109>
- [19] Devit, M., & Ridwan, N. (2023). Dampak framing hasil survey pemilihan presiden 2024 mempengaruhi persepsi publik. *Jurnal Kajian Ilmiah*, 23(3), 233–242. <https://doi.org/10.31599/jki.v23i3.2805>
- [20] Lim, M. (2023). Illiberal democracy and the media in Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 53(2), 232–250. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2022.2099374>

- [21] Nugroho, Y., & Syarief, S. S. (2024). Media sustainability and political pressure in Southeast Asia. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 34(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2023.2257812>
- [22] Nugroho, C. (2026). Digital cognitive democracy and the public sphere in Indonesia's electoral politics. *Frontiers in Communication*, 11, Article 1697979. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2026.1697979>
- [23] Weiss, M. L. (2021). Can civil society safeguard rights in Asia? *Asian Studies Review*, 45(1), 13–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2020.1828274>
- [24] Tomsa, D., & Bax, N. (2023). Democratic regression and environmental politics in Indonesia. *Asian Studies Review*, 47(4), 740–760. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2023.2189690>

