A Juridical Study on the Limitations of the President's Prerogative Right in the Appointment of Public Officials
Keywords:
Presidential Prerogative, Appointment of Public Officials, Checks and Balances, Constitutional LawAbstract
The President of the Republic of Indonesia possesses constitutional powers termed "prerogative rights," notably exercised in appointing ministers, the National Police Chief, the Military Commander, ambassadors, and independent state commissioners. Although often portrayed as absolute, the post-reform 1945 Constitution embeds these powers within a distribution of powers framework, subjecting several key appointments to parliamentary approval or consideration. This study examines the juridical scope and constitutional limits of this presidential prerogative, aiming to formulate a normative model that reconciles executive discretion with checks and balances. Employing a normative juridical method with statute, conceptual, and case approaches, the research analyzes primary legal materials alongside secondary academic literature. The findings reveal that presidential prerogative operates along a spectrum: exclusive executive authority, authority requiring DPR approval, and authority requiring DPR consideration or institutional involvement. Constitutional Court Decision No. 22/PUU-XIII/2015 confirms that parliamentary involvement does not violate the presidential system, provided it does not paralyze executive function. The study concludes that a calibrated, function-sensitive limitation distinguishing purely political appointments from appointments to independent, judicial, or oversight institutions safeguards both executive effectiveness and institutional accountability.
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